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Eight reasons CIOs think developers are clueless

04-Sep-08

Eight reasons CIOs think developers are clueless

Many developers need to gain the bigger-picture view of their organizations to appreciate the challenges of their “clueless” CIOs

By Thomas Wailgum, IDG News Service
September 03, 2008

CIO.com has published several stories that examined the sometimes volatile, often misunderstood and never dull relationship between CIOs and application developers — from “9 Reasons Why Application Developers Think Their CIO Is Clueless” to “8 Reasons Why a Developer Would NEVER Want To Be a CIO” to “Getting Clueful: 7 Things CIOs Should Know About Agile Development.”

Those articles were presented solely from the programmer’s viewpoint, however. We wanted to give the bosses — CIOs and IT leaders who perhaps were irked by the “clueless” label — a chance to respond. Because, certainly, developers can be out-of-touch too — just in different ways.

[ Keep up with app dev issues and trends with InfoWorld's Fatal Exception and Strategic Developer blogs. ]

CIO.com asked IT leaders what they wish developers knew so that the programmers don’t appear clueless to the rest of the organization. The bosses’ responses, gathered from eight CIOs and IT managers and which have been anonymously condensed, show that many developers need to gain the bigger-picture view of their organizations to appreciate the challenges of those “clueless” CIOs.

“It turns out that the concepts of business strategy bear repeating,” observes one IT director. “Developers get so heads-down in the minutiae of coding that they forget about the 40,000-foot view of the business.”

1. Developers Don’t Think Practically
Developers often look for an elegant or slick solution to a problem, but they don’t always look for the practical one. “I’ve had developers that will go to any lengths to write something instead of buying it, even if their hours cost more initially, plus upgrades and testing each and every time the data base or interfaces change,” notes one CIO. “I rid myself of one of those [developers] recently.”

This CIO retells a story: “I had to fire a developer who never had an error when his program compiled; he desk-checked [the application] so many times to assure himself (and it was a source of his pride) there were no errors. The compilers had error checking routines to do much of the same thing. His programs were elegant, but he got fired for scarcity of output. Others who used the compiler testing were completing 300 percent of his output, but he just couldn’t give up his opinion of the correct way to do it.”

2. Developers Still Don’t See the End-User Perspective
Solving business problems is more complex than everyone imagines, says one CIO. But to IT management, the business unit and the development team, these problems often appear quite easy to solve. “Getting your development team to truly see the world from the end-user perspective is important and much harder than you would think,” notes the CIO. “The developers need to learn to quickly empathize with the end users’ needs and issues-and attack the solution from that perspective.”

Adds an IT director: “Personally, it is surprising to me that most of the developers that I work with still have no sense of the user experience. A development team can create an application that does everything from balance your checkbook to burning your toast, but if the user interface sucks, no one will use it-period. No amount of training or re-training will make users sign on to an application with a difficult UI. That simple concept seems to be a struggle for developers to understand.”

Another CIO adds: “As a developer, I want to add as much functionality as rapidly as possible to keep users happy,” says the CIO. “As a CIO I want the users to still be happy five years from now, which takes a bit more upfront planning.”

3. Developers Can’t Get Away from the “Wow” Factor
Developers love the “cool” or “wow” factor of applications. CIOs seek stability and standardization. “It’s more efficient to be on one platform than to spread your resources thin over many because you bring in the best new tool without retiring the legacy,” says a CIO.

Another CIO points to the dire need to build applications for reliability and scalability. “Many business owners have a short attention span and limited patience. We need to engineer applications for rapid performance under maximum load,” the CIO says. “An application with fewer features that is completely stable and fast is better than a full-featured application that is unreliable and slow.”

“I’m less concerned about cool technology or wow factor,” the CIO adds, “and am more concerned that the finished application supports the required business processes.”

4. Developers Don’t Think About ROI, TCO, and Other Business Priorities
A CIO has to balance a whole panoply of choices and pressures, says a CIO. “Often the best way to do something is to make it cost effective-not cool. CIOs have to weigh risks and costs and potential benefits. Remember the 80/20 rule, think of return on investment and total cost of ownership issues and business priorities. The developers have a limited number of tasks to do and can pretty much concentrate on one item. Many have spent their career focusing on the development of simple working units, not running a business.”

Another CIO says that “the CIO is not only responsible for getting the right technical solutions to the company but also ensuring that a number of additional objectives are met including TCO, positive relationships with the business units, the strategic use of the IT function and more. Getting this done may make the CIO look aloof or clueless-but without this leadership, IT will fail in the organization.”

The IT director says that developers also lack a sense of how their work impacts the business and therefore the bottom line; or a broad knowledge of the business strategy. “These are fundamentals that need to be included in any in-house developer’s career development plan,” the IT director adds.

5. Developers Don’t Get the Underlying IT Value Proposition
The CIO is trying to show the overall value of the IT function to the organization, notes one CIO (unless it is a software company, which is a different model). The executives that CIOs have as customers are trying to get an answer, perform some function and get their jobs done.

“IT to them is like electricity: they need it, but they don’t appreciate it,” says the CIO. “Having the’prima donna’ developers’ attitude that the organization exists to provide them with some intellectual stimulation is not what the executives want to hear or feel!”

Instead, some developers think it’s all about their code. They fail to understand the mission of the business and “that they don’t drive it, they support it,” notes the IT manager. “Their work is often not mission critical or urgent.”

6. Developers Don’t Have (or Want) Corporate Skillsets
Most developers do not have the skills to become a CIO, observes one CIO. “I think a survey would show that 80 percent of the CIOs that came up through IT to be a CIO came through the operations side,” says the CIO.

The skills required of a IT leader, the CIO contends, are not those of a developer: CIOs have to deal with uncertainty-not hard and fast coded rules; CIOs have to manage the economics of IT-not the technical “coolness” factor; CIOs have to live in a world of compromise-not the “one true answer.”

“I think it is like the Mars and Venus gender discussions,” notes the CIO. “What they see depends on where they stand, and they stand in completely different environments.”

7. Developers Aren’t Into “Group Think”
“When you get a technical team together to discuss issues and ideas for improvement you will hear what sounds like a consensus set of issues and solutions,” observes a CIO. You need to probe deeper, the CIO says, because “each technical person is different and when asked individually you will find that they do not all share the group opinion, thus solving for the group’s suggestions won’t bring about all of the desired results.”

Along similar lines, another CIO points out that “the lone genius developer” is a risk to the organization since his departure can put entire applications at risk. “Every application needs to be developed by a team and have thorough documentation so that it does not depend on any one person,” the CIO adds.

8. Developers Don’t Understand Staffing
One CIO says that developers think that profitable companies shouldn’t have layoffs, which the CIO feels is clueless. “That’s like saying as long as the flowers are growing, you shouldn’t prune,” the CIO says. “Efficient companies need prune back in areas they grow out of to preserve the strength of the overall company.”

In addition, the CIO says that many developers think offshoring is un-American. The Hudson Institute Center forecasts that by 2014 the U.S. economy will need 9 million more degree holders than will be available, offers the CIO. ” Offshoring IT helps CIOs to manage this gap,” the CIO says.

BONUS: What CIOs Admit They Do Wrong
Several CIOs who read “9 Reasons Why Application Developers Think Their CIO Is Clueless” article admitted some fault in communication and relationship breakdowns that can occur. Notes one CIO, on why each side can appear clueless: “Failure of the organization to provide transparency between business units to help everyone understand each other’s role in supporting the vision and mission.”

Another CIO says the problem is that “Most organizations are structured to build barriers between the user community and the development community. This is especially the case when development is outsourced,” notes the CIO. “Organizations place liaisons (or business consultants) as interfaces to the business. Developers are therefore at quite a distance from the business and risk losing touch with what’s really important to drive the business.”

CIO.com

21 Great Technologies That Failed.

01-Sep-08

21 Great Technologies That Failed

ARTICLE DATE: 07.18.08
By Jeremy A. Kaplan and Sascha Segan

Think of Microsoft Bob, the IBM PCjr, and worse. But those weren’t necessarily great products—heck, Bob wasn’t a good idea at all. The ideas and innovations that succeed aren’t necessarily the best either; they just happened to be in the right place at the right time.

So we took a look back over the years at some of the greatest flops to come out of both Microsoft and Apple, technology that failed not because it was lacking in brilliance but often because it was simply ahead of its time. Read on for a walk through technology’s leftover lane.—Next: 10 Great Microsoft Technologies That Failed

10 Great Microsoft Technologies That Failed

WebTV (1997)
Set-top boxes don’t need to be dumb, and for the past few years, the move has been on to embed new technologies and extra smarts into them, including DVR functionality, two-way communication, Web surfing, and more. Microsoft bought WebTV back in the late nineties, relabeled it MSN TV, and eventually spun it off as a separate company. One could argue that the market has reached its zenith with Internet-connected set top-boxes like the Xbox 360 and Apple TV.

Tablet PCs (2002)
Rather than typing on a PC, why not write on it as though it were a pad of paper? And have the CPU interpret your chicken scratch, sort your notes, and generally work in a much smarter way? Based on sales, it seems the world still isn’t ready for the Tablet PC. Nevertheless, Gates is convinced you’ll eventually love this system.

WinFS (1990s)
Bill Gates, in his own words: “There is a famous quest of mine called integrated storage, where you have not just a file system but more of a flexible object-type database: Things like your contacts, calendars, favorites, your photos, your music—and how you rate those things—are stored in a structured environment.” WinFS was this system, the next-gen underpinning to Windows, and it was planned as part of Cairo, the code name for Windows 95. It’s still a great idea. But making it happen? Not so easy.

Sidewalk.com (1997)
In the heady days of the dot-com era, Microsoft rolled out a mammoth project: local Web sites for every major metropolitan area in the country. The plan? One easy-to-remember location for all the local information you could ever need, from a plumber or restaurant to the local chamber of commerce. Although the sites crashed and burned as the bubble burst, it’s clear that local information is what we all want from the Internet—on our phones, perhaps?

OS/2 (1987)
A joint project between IBM and Microsoft, OS/2 was simple, elegant, and very, very advanced. It was intended to be a multitasking, object-oriented replacement to the world of Windows. But Microsoft abandoned the project to IBM, and turned back to its own OS. Then something funny happened on the road to OS/2. Microsoft Windows emerged as a dazzling multitasking operating system that OS/2 was still struggling to become.

Passport (2000)
It’s basically your Windows Live ID now, and grants you access to your Xbox gaming account, but before that it was Passport, and Microsoft wanted it to serve as a universal log-in key to the Internet. Great idea! Never happened, primarily because of fears that Microsoft would end up controlling the Internet, in addition to our desktops. The Liberty Alliance, founded by Sun Microsystems, eventually accomplished a few of Passport’s original goals.

Windows Live Spaces (2004)
Microsoft created Spaces back in 2004, to allow everyone a personal corner of cyberspace—and to gain a toehold in the emerging world of social networking. Sure, people used it, but Spaces never gained the popularity of, for example, the similarly named MySpace.

.NET (2002)
Runtime compiled, and featuring Net-connected apps back when people were laughing at the idea? You go, Microsoft! Go people did…to Java. Microsoft keeps improving the .NET framework, and people do build apps based on it, but it has nowhere near the scope that MS had envisioned back in 2002.

WinG (1993)
WinG was an attempt to allow applications—mostly games—to access video, audio, and game-controller hardware directly from within Windows, much the way game developers had done with DOS. WinG arrived on Windows 95, but failed to gain traction. Many of the concepts later appeared in DirectX, however, so while WinG wasn’t a success in itself, it spawned the later technology and made high-performance PC games possible for Windows.

Sidewinder Freestyle Pro (1998)
Long before the Nintendo Wii made the concept of force feedback fun again, Microsoft added to its line of popular game controllers an early game pad with a tilt sensor, for the PC. Fun? Sure. Popular? Not particularly.

11 Great Apple Technologies That Failed

OpenDoc (1992)
Released in 1992, OpenDoc was an effort to change the metaphor of computing completely—no wonder it was destined to fail. Instead of an application-centric user experience, OpenDoc created a system where mini-applications contributed “parts” to generic, multipart documents. You’d start a blank document and then add a “drawing part,” an “audio part,” and a Web-clipping part, for instance. But OpenDoc used massive amounts of memory and processor power for the time, never mind the vast mental shift it required for users and developers. You can see OpenDoc-like thinking today in the way embedded media, Java applets, and Web applications work.

Cyberdog (1996)
Apple’s first official stab at a Web browser was much too ambitious, in part because it was supposed to be OpenDoc’s flagship app. Cyberdog included a browser, an e-mail program, a Usenet news reader, and an FTP program. Rather than conventional bookmark lists, it encouraged users to create “notebooks,” Web page–like super-documents of embedded Web content and links. The more-conventional Safari browser seems to be doing better in the marketplace.

HyperCard (1987)
HyperCard was not a failure. Released in 1987, it was a database, a hypertext system, a presentation program, and a software development platform. For millions of Mac users, it was their introduction to programming. I organized my comic-book collection in HyperCard at age 14; the original version of the best-selling adventure game Myst was written in HyperCard. The program’s heyday ran from 1987 to 1990, but it kept puttering on until Steve Jobs killed the project in 2000. HyperCard’s ideas ended up in things like HTML, JavaScript, AppleScript, Adobe Flash, and wikis. Maybe they aren’t all directly descended from it, but HyperCard came first.

Newton (1993)
Ah, the Newton. When it came out in 1993, we said it would “make you the life of the party.” And it wasn’t unique by a long shot: There were a whole lot of pen-based computers coming out at this time that ultimately failed (remember the AT&T EO?). But the Newton can be seen as the forerunner of the iPhone, a much more successful product. And the Newton had several innovations that still look futuristic: It automatically related different kinds of information and understood natural-language queries. (You can see some of that relational connection in the way Gmail offers to map the locations of your e-mail contacts.)

PowerBook Duo 230 (1992)
The MacBook Air of 1992, the PowerBook Duo was one of the first ultraportable laptops. At 10.9 by 8.5 by 1.4 inches and 4.1 pounds, it was thinner and lighter at launch than any competing model except for Gateway’s 286-powered Handbook. The Duo slid into a dock to achieve full desktop capabilities; the largest dock even included expansion slots, an FPU, and Level 2 cache for the processor! But the Duo didn’t capture consumers’ hearts the way more full-featured PowerBooks did. Will the MacBook Air succeed where the Duo failed?

Mac G4 Cube (1999)
A miracle of engineering, this small-form-factor desktop PC was nominated in 2000 for a PC Magazine Technical Excellence award for managing to shoehorn a full PC into an 8-inch cube. The Cube itself wasn’t a winner, but it inaugurated the entire small-form-factor PC market. Shuttle followed the next year with the SV24, and Apple came back in 2005 with the Mac mini.

eWorld (1994)
Could “AOL” have stood for “Apple On Line?” Apple’s eWorld was a cuddly, easy-to-use online service, originally developed by Apple and AOL. It included bulletin boards, support services, chat rooms, and even, eventually, a Web browser—powerful stuff for 1994. But Apple’s then-CEO Michael Spindler decided not to market or advertise it, and charged high prices. A promised Windows version never appeared. With few subscribers, eWorld shut its doors in 1996. We trust that MobileMe, Apple’s new online service, will fare much better.

Macintosh TV (1993)
In 1993, the idea of watching TV on your PC was pretty unusual. The Macintosh TV was basically a hack; a Performa 520 Mac running System 7.1 with a 14-inch Sony TV built into it. There was no real integration between the computer and the TV, and that bulky, underpowered Performa model wasn’t very popular anyway. This model came out during a period when Apple was spewing out dozens of PCs with confusing specs and product numbers, and it disappeared from the market quickly. Nowadays, of course, watching TV on your computer is considered a perfectly ordinary thing to do.

Mac Quadra 610 DOS Compatible (1994)
Before 2005, Apple and Intel were never to meet, right? Mortal enemies. Vile foes. Wrong. Apple actually released several Macs with Intel coprocessors during the dark years of the 1990s; the Quadra 610, released in February 1994, was the first. (That’s not counting third-party products like MacCharlie, a coprocessing unit from Dayna Communications released way back in 1985.) This model paired a 25-MHz Motorola 68040 processor with an Intel 486SX-25 and let users switch between Mac and DOS modes—a feature repeated 12 years later with Boot Camp, no coprocessor needed.

Bandai Pippin (1996)
Apple’s much-derided game-console platform, released in 1996, was an Internet-connected gaming and multimedia box that ran a PC operating system, Apple’s System 7. So, yes, you could argue that it was an Xbox, or an Apple TV. In 1996. But 1996 technology wasn’t ready for this idea; the Pippin was expensive and slow, and people didn’t really understand what it was for. It took Microsoft to succeed with the first truly PC-based, Net-connected game console, the Xbox, in 2001.

QuickTake 100 (1994)
Arguably the first consumer digital camera in the U.S., the QuickTake 100 was a strange departure for Apple when it came out in 1994; after all, the company had no photography experience. The $749 QuickTake could store a mere eight VGA-quality photos; it was fixed-focus, and it had no zoom. It downloaded images to Macs—and only Macs—over a serial cable. Kodak, which had previously built professional-quality digital cameras, later stepped in and took over the market, along with other manufacturers. This was an early stab at the consumer electronics market for Apple, which succeeded much better with the iPod in 2001.

Survey: IT staff would steal secrets if laid off

01-Sep-08

Survey: IT staff would steal secrets if laid off

by Computerworld UK staff
August 29, 2008 -